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Book Review

THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:

PSYCHOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES

by

Saul M. Kassin* and Lawrence S. Wrightsman. ** New York, N.Y.:
Hemisphere Publishing Corp. (1988) xi, 232 pp. $39.50.
Reviewed by Leo M. Romero***

Psychological research provides insights into human behavior that
relate to the American system of adjudication. This research needs
to be brought to the attention of legal scholars, judges, and practicing lawyers. The adversary system of adjudication in the United
States includes the right to trial by jury in most cases, both civil and
criminal.' Even though most legal disputes are settled before trial
and some trials are tried to a judge without a jury, jury trials occur
with sufficient frequency2 to merit serious study of jury behavior.
Furthermore, the jury trial represents the paradigm of litigation in
the United States. The extensive rules of procedure and evidence
established for jury trials reflect the importance ofjuries as triers of
Associate Professor of Psychology, Williams College.
Professor of Psychology, University of Kansas.
***
Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. A.B. 1965, Oberlin College; J.D.
1968, Washington University; LL.M. 1972, Georgetown University.
1. The right to trial by jury in criminal cases appears in Article III and the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court applied the right to trial by jury in criminal cases to the states as part of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968). The
Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in federal civil cases, and virtually every state provides for jury trials in both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 16; MD. CONST. arts. XXI & XXIII.
2. See R. SIMON, THEJURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3 (1980). In particular,
this book cites data from the December 13, 1973 issue of U.S. News and World Report
showing that in that year 150,000jury trials were held and 2,000,000 citizens were called
for jury duty. Id.
*
**
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fact, 3 and the public generally associates trials with jury trials. The
prominence of the jury trial in the adversary model of litigation and
in the public's conception of our legal system requires analysis of
how the jury functions.
The procedures used injury trials rest on assumptions about jury
behavior, some of which have been tested in empirical studies. The
research has important implications for the jury trial. These implications will be of interest and importance not only to the legal
profession but to members of the public in general, many of whom
have served or will serve as jurors.
The AmericanJury on Trial: Psychological Perspectives4 by Kassin and
Wrightsman reviews the psychological research on both human behavior and jury behavior as it relates to the jury's role in the adversary system. The authors, professors of psychology, offer the
insights of psychologists into the workings of the jury trial that
should be of special interest to the legal profession. Kassin and
Wrightsman, who are both familiar with the jury system by reason of
5
their research, experiments, and experience as expert witnesses,
examine the accepted theories of the way the jury should function in
the adversary system and the psychological assumptions that underlie these theories. They then review the psychological literature to
see whether the empirical studies support or contradict the assumptions on which the jury trial is founded.
Kassin and Wrightsman identify four requirements for the proper
functioning of the jury and then evaluate the trial by jury against
these requirements. The jury must be (1) impartial; (2) able to understand the process, the evidence, and the instructions of law; (3)
able to base its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial;
and (4) able to deliberate meaningfully before returning a verdict. 6
The authors assert that various jury research methods permit an assessment of the jury's ability to function ideally. 7 They reject anec3. See S.

LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIALJUSTICE:

THE AMERICAN APPROACH

4-5 (1988) (describing the highly structured procedures governing
pretrial, trial, and post-trial periods).

TO ADJUDICATION

4. S.

KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN,

THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:

PSYCHOLOGICAL

(1988).
5. The publisher's jacket for the book includes the following information about the
authors. Professor Kassin was a National Institute of Mental Health Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Psychology and Law Program at Stanford University, 1985-1986,
and a U.S. Supreme CourtJudicial Fellow, 1984-1985, serving as a research associate at
the Federal Judicial Center. He has worked with trial lawyers as a jury consultant and
expert witness. Professor Wrightsman directs the Kansas Jury Research Project, which
has produced two books and over a dozen research articles. S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4.
6. Id. at 6-12.
7. The authors describe the following research methods: (1) examining existing
court records; (2) interviewing jurors, judges, and lawyers who participated in actual
PERSPECTIVES

trials; (3) conducting experiments with simulated trials and mock juries; and (4) using
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dotes and war stories as sources of valid information about 8jury
behavior, although they do use them for illustrative purposes.
Kassin and Wrightsman recommend certain modifications that reflect psychological insights into jury behavior. They see the jury system as a valuable part of the American system of adjudication 9 and
defend it against some of the criticisms leveled against it.

°

The

book, however, is not an apologia for the jury system. It finds fault
with certain trial procedures that impair the proper functioning of
the jury and recommends changes that will improve jury
decisionmaking. 11
The authors first examine the effect of pretrial bias on the ability
of ajuror to be impartial. They reviewjury studies that explore the
relationship between jury decisions and individual juror characteristics and attitudes. The empirical research shows that jury decisions
are driven more by the evidence than by the individual characteristics or attitudes of the jury members. Contrary to trial lawyers' assumptions about the influence of a juror's religion, occupation, or
socio-economic level,' 2 the studies show that personality traits gen3
erally do not predict juror behavior.'
Juror attitudes on specific issues, however, do provide a better
guide to juror behavior but only in cases in which those issues are
prominent. For example, Kassin and Wrightsman note that ajuror's
attitude toward the death penalty will often indicate whether that
juror will more likely vote for conviction or acquittal in a criminal
case. Juries whose members have no qualms about the imposition
of the death penalty are more likely to convict than juries without
jurors willing to impose the death penalty.' 4 Thus, apart from cases
that involve emotionally charged issues, such as death penalty prosecutions, empirical research shows that jury decisions reflect the
strength of the evidence more than the individual characteristics of
jury members.
The authors question how effectively the legal system screens citizens for jury service.15 Specifically, they question the value of voir
dire examination to detect bias on the part ofjurors. They find that
voir dire examination of prospective jurors does not often fulfill its
job of securing an impartial jury because lawyers openly subvert the
shadow juries to listen to real trials and then deliberate and return a verdict. Id. at 1419.
8. See id. at 14.
9. Id. at 208.
10. See, e.g., id. at 123-27 (defending the position that jurors are competent to handle even complex civil cases).
11. The final chapter summarizes the major problems the authors see with jury trials
as they are conducted and includes the modifications they recommend to improve the
functioning of the jury system. Id. at 208-15.
12. See, e.g., P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY 363-64 (1979); K. HEGLUND, TRIAL AND
PRAC-ICE SKILLS 86-87 (1978); J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 167-77 (1975) (quoting
Clarence Darrow in a 1936 article in Esquire); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 30-32 (2d ed. 1988).
13. S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4, at 29, 31-35.

14. Id. at 39.
15. Id. at 49.
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process by using voir dire to create bias rather than to discover it.
The authors doubt that voir dire effectively discovers juror bias
because the attorneys do most of the talking. According to one
study the authors cite, only forty-one percent of all statements made
during voir dire of jurors were made by prospective jurors, and
sixty-three percent of the lawyers' questions asked for yes or no answers.' 6 When judges take control of voir dire, they avoid the danger of counsel attempting to influence the jury but at the cost of
superficial questioning that produces quicker jury selection.
Although the empirical studies do not permit the authors to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of counsel-conducted or judgeconducted voir dire in producing an impartial jury, they make
suggestions for improving the jury selection process that minimize
the role of attorneys. Kassin and Wrightsman recommend that
judges be trained in interviewing skills in order to increase their
ability to detect juror bias when conducting voir dire. They also
suggest that a portion of voir dire be conducted through written
17
questionnaires.
On a more critical note, the authors place too much of the blame
on attorneys for the problems they see with the jury selection process. One of the studies cited suggests that voir dire by attorneys
was effective in some cases in challenging jurors who would return a
verdict different from the verdict returned by the actual jury.'8 The
authors also admit that studies and surveys show great differences
among lawyers in the skill of selecting jurors. 19 By recommending
that attorney voir dire be replaced with judge questioning and written questions, Kassin and Wrightsman overlook the value of competent and trained lawyers in ensuring impartial juries. Proper
training of lawyers in examining prospective jurors and ofjudges in
supervising attorney voir dire would preserve the value of the adversarial detection of bias and would make parties more accepting of
20
jury decisions.
Kassin and Wrightsman devote four chapters to the evaluation of
the jury's ability to understand, assess, and process the information
needed for reliable decisions reflected in verdicts. 21 The authors
cite several research studies showing that the jury possesses these
16. See id. at 51-52 (citing Balch, Griffiths, Hall & Winfree, The Socialization ofJurors:
The Voir Dire as a Rite of Passage, 4J. CRIM. JUST. 271, 271-83 (1976)).
17. Id. at 209-10.

18. Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges onjury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 506-08 (1978).
19. S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4, at 56 (citing G. BERMANT, CONDUCT OF
THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION:

PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 20

(1977) and Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 18, at 517-18).
20. See S. LANDSMAN, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the value of neutrality in the

decisionmaking process).
21.
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S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4, at chs. 4-7.

capabilities but that certain trial procedures make its functioning

more difficult.2 2 For example, they refer to research indicating that

jurors would better understand the applicable law if the instructions
were given to the jury before the evidence is presented and if the
instructions were written for comprehension.23 In addition, the
authors cite studies concluding that juries could better assess the
credibility of witnesses if their attention were directed to body language rather than facial expressions. 24 Moreover, the authors note
research indicating that juries could better evaluate the reliability of
eyewitness identification testimony if2 they
were informed of the limi5
tations of eyewitness identifications.
Based on these studies, the authors recommend certain changes
in the way that trials are conducted. They suggest that information
about the need to scrutinize identification testimony be brought to
the attention of the jury by the judge through instructions or by testimony of psychological experts about perception, memory, and
eyewitness testimony studies. They conclude that the courts can do
26
more to aid jurors in reaching reliable decisions.
Because the authors also see the ability ofjurors to suspend judgment until all of the evidence is presented as contributing to reliable
decisions, they suggest ways to help jurors keep an open mind during the trial.2 7 In the adversarial presentation of evidence, one side
presents its evidence before the other. The authors describe the
psychological phenomenon of the "primacy effect," the tendency to
make snap judgments based on information presented early in the
trial. Kassin and Wrightsman assert that once jurors form a first
impression, they often discount or reject facts that challenge their
views, 28 and they may fill in missing details in their trial memories in
ways that favor their initial decision. 29 To mitigate the primacy effect in jury trials, Kassin and Wrightsman recommend periodic reminders to the jury to keep an open mind. The judge could
periodically so instruct them3 0 or permit counsel to make interim
summations during the course of the trial. 3 1 The authors state that
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

213.
145-46.
70.
80-84.
210-14.
136.

28. Id. at 134 (citing N. ANDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMATION INTEGRATION
THEORY 179-81 (1981)).

29. Id. at 135 (citing Loftus, ReconstructingMemory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOLDec. 1974, at 117-19).
30. This type of instruction would probably minimize the juror's tendency to form
rigid first impressions, according to a study by Luchins, Primay-Recency in Impression For-

OGY TODAY,

mation, in THE ORDER OF PRESENTATION IN PERSUASION 33-61 (C. Hovland ed. 1957).

31. A report and evaluation of the use of interim summations in the Westmoreland
libel trial against CBS appears in Arthurs, Mini-Summation Lauded in Libel Case, Legal
Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 1. A federal judge permitted attorneys for both sides to make
interim summations over the course of a five-month trial. Each side could interrupt the
presentation of evidence for interim summations. A total of two hours was allotted per
side, and the summations ran from two to five minutes on average. Both sides reported
that they liked the opportunity to halt the presentation of evidence at various times in
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such reminders minimize the primacy effect and encourage the jury
32
to suspend judgment until they have heard all of the evidence.
These recommendations deserve consideration by judges and lawyers, especially in longer trials. Periodic instructions or interim
summations do not require much time, and juries might more accurately decide cases if they can suspend judgment until both
adversaries have presented their cases.
In' connection with an assessment of the jury's ability to understand and process information, Kassin and Wrightsman address the
issue ofjury competence in complex civil cases. 33 They evaluate the
arguments against the use of juries in complex litigation and find
that the criticism of the competence of juries to decide complex
cases rests upon certain assumptions that are without empirical support. The critics make three assumptions according to the authors:
(1) some cases are too complex for lay juries; (2) juries in complex
cases often include few jurors with the education or professional experience necessary to understand the case; and (3) judges would be
more competent to decide such cases. 3 4 Kassin and Wrightsman
claim that no experiments have either tested the informationprbcessing performance of jurors in complex civil cases or compared the competence of judge and jury in deciding such cases. 35
36
The authors rely on Kalven and Zeisel's classic study of the jury
and on a survey ofjudges and lawyers who participated in complex
trials over a three-year period3 7 to show the absence of any
problems with juror competence. The respondents in the survey
uniformly agreed that the juries did a good job, and the majority
thought the jury had reached the correct decision. The authors conclude that those who criticize the use of the jury in complex cases
have failed to show that jurors cannot correctly decide such cases or
38
that judges would be more competent as triers of fact.
the trial in order to clarify certain points. The defendant's lawyer especially appreciated
the advantage of keeping the "jurors' minds open" during the several months that the
plaintiff presented its case. Id. at 1. He indicated that "[tihe ability of the plaintiff to
condition the jury during the first several months is critical. Interim summations gives
the defense an opportunity to counter that." Id. at 6.
32. S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4, at 137 (claiming that psychological
studies support the notion that periodic reminders mitigate the primacy effect) (citing
Anderson & Hubert, Effects of Concomitant Verbal Recall on Order Effects in PersonalityImpression Formation, 2 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 379, 391 (1963)).
33. See generally Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80
MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981) (providing a thorough discussion of this issue).
34. S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 4, at 125.
35. Id. at 126.
36. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149-59 (1966). This study found
virtually no difference between the frequency of disagreement between judge and jury
when the case was easy or difficult. Id.
37. The FederalJudicial Center interviewed 68judges and lawyers who participated
in 7 jury trials lasting from 2 to 30 months.
38.
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S. KAssIN & L.

WRIGHTSMAN,

supra note 4, at 108-11.

Because the jury trial has such a prominent role in the adversary
system and because of its constitutional status, we should be careful
before abandoning trial by jury in an undefined class of cases said to
be complex and, therefore, beyond the competence ofjurors. Further research seems warranted to evaluate jury competence in different types of cases and to assess the role of lawyers in complicating
or simplifying cases for juries and judges.
The authors additionally examine the extent to which juries can
base decisions solely on admissible evidence and resist using information that is stricken from the record after they have heard it.
They refer to empirical studies that support the conventional wisdom of trial lawyers that juries cannot ignore stricken evidence that
is relevant to the case.39 Indeed, juries are more likely to consider
such evidence if admonished by the court not to consider it than
they are if no specific instruction is given. These studies confirm the
suspicion of attorneys that curative instructions often increase the
harm of the stricken evidence. Other studies cited by Kassin and
Wrightsman suggest that trial lawyers should guard against the
presentation of inadmissible information in statements by opposing
counsel. Jury research indicates thatjuries tend to forget the source
of the information that they remember and shows that juries are
often unable to recall accurately whether the source of information
came from a witness or one of the attorneys in the opening statement or closing argument. 40 In particular, one study the authors
present revealed that juries treated the statements made by counsel
in opening statement as fact even though no evidence was introduced to support the attorney's assertion. The same study showed,
however, that jurors tended to place no weight on the attorney's
unsupported statement if the opposing counsel brought the failure
41
of proof to the attention of the jury.
Last, Kassin and Wrightsman describe the deliberation process
and examine the effect of the procedural rules that control jury deliberations. They use the social psychology of group influence as a
framework for evaluating the dynamics ofjury deliberations. 4 2 They
find the empirical evidence inconclusive with respect to criticisms
that jury sequestration, instructions to break deadlocked juries, and
jury size (six-person versus twelve-person) improperly affect the
quality ofjury decisions. 4 3 Several studies, however, reveal substantial differences in deliberations when majority rather than unani39. See id. at 108-09.
40. Id. at 106.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 175.
43. No empirical evidence exists on the impact of sequestration on jury decisions.
See id. at 190. "There are no studies comparing deadlocked juries blasted with the dynamite charge to those left to their own devices. Nor are there studies of how juries deliberate before versus after receiving this kind of instruction." Id. at 194. The authors
recognize that smaller juries have fewer minority jurors, but the rates of conviction and
acquittal do not seem to be affected by the size of the jury. See id. at 198. In addition,
they cite research showing that six-person juries include a greater percentage of juror
participation than twelve-person juries. See id. at 199.
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mous verdicts are permitted. Juries that take a preliminary vote
shortly after the commencement of deliberations tend to spend less
time reviewing evidence and less time in arriving at a verdict than
they do when voting is deferred to a later time. These studies lead
the authors to suggest that unanimity be required for verdicts and
in
that jurors be instructed on how to proceed in their deliberations
44
order to maximize the value of group deliberations.
The authors' first suggestion, requiring unanimous verdicts,
places a high value on a deliberation process that takes into account
the views of the minority. A unanimity requirement means that the
majority must persuade the minority rather than dismiss their views
by voting them down. Although more deadlocked juries might result from a unanimity requirement, the value of quality deliberations
in producing accurate decisions should outweigh the cost of retrials
in some cases.
The authors' recommendation that judges instruct juries on how
to proceed in their deliberations seems reasonable. The time
needed to instruct the jury would be minimal, and the authors do
not suggest that jury deliberations be monitored to ensure compliance with these instructions. This recommendation, therefore, does
not intrude on the independence and confidentiality ofjury deliberations, while giving the jury some guidance about how to proceed.
Conclusion
The AmericanJury on Trial: PsychologicalPerspectives provides a scholarly analysis of both the legal and psychological aspects of the jury
trial. The authors demonstrate a good understanding of trial procedure, though their discussion of "relevancy" reflects a misunderstanding of the rules of evidence governing the admissibility of
character evidence.4 5 Their legal research includes references to
important Supreme Court decisions, law review articles, and trial
advocacy books that will be helpful to the practitioner. The book is
also current, and therefore includes many references to recent jury
trials providing examples of jury behavior.
The legal profession should seriously consider the psychological
perspectives on the operation of the jury in the adversary system.
This book offers a readable source of empirical studies concerning
the jury. 4 6 The authors describe in understandable terms relevant
44. Id. at 214-15.
45. The authors provide the following example of "relevant" evidence: "Thus if an
individual is sued for causing an automobile collision by driving negligently, that person's accident record is relevant because it sheds light on his or her predisposition for
negligence." Id. at 107. This example ignores Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that makes predisposition evidence inadmissible to show conduct in civil cases.
46. Other books discussing generally the jury trial and empirical studies include: R.
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psychological and jury research and explain the significance of the
research results. Although the empirical studies included in this
book are available from other sources, lawyers will find this book a
helpful reference on jury behavior because many of the studies are
not easily accessible to attorneys. 4 7 For the reader who wants to
explore some of the research studies in greater depth, the book includes references to the technical journals and other sources in
which the empirical studies appear.
The American Jury on Trial: PsychologicalPerspectives shows the legal
profession that jury trials are not solely the concern of lawyers and
judges. Other academic disciplines can offer insights into the operation of legal institutions such as the jury trial. The legal profession
should be willing to reevaluate its institutions, procedures, and doctrines in light of this advancing knowledge. Whether or not we
agree with the recommendations made by Kassin and Wrightsman,
legal scholars, judges, and lawyers should seriously consider the implications of the psychological and empirical research this book
presents. Our rules of evidence generally accept scientific or other
specialized knowledge as proof of facts in litigation; 4 8 we should
likewise be receptive to empirical evidence in evaluating our own
rules and procedure.
HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
supra note 36; THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982); R.
SIMON, supra note 2.

47. Trial advocacy books, evidence treatises, and casebooks rarely include the psychological research relevant to legal doctrines, rules, or institutions. Books on trial ad-

vocacy, for example, rarely support their conclusions about jury behavior with citations
to empirical studies. See, e.g., P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL (1979); K.
HEGLUND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL (1978);J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY
(1975); R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS (2d ed. 1973); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES (2d ed. 1988). Psychological developments pertinent to the
legal profession most often have appeared in law review articles. See, e.g., Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV. 277 (1952); Mendez, California s New
Law on CharacterEvidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological
Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984); Stewart, Perception,Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism
of Present Law and the ProposedFederal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1; Teitelbaum,
Sutton-Barbere &Johnson, Evaluating the PreudicialEffect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify
the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147. For one of the few law
books bringing the results of social research to bear on the legal process, see W. LOH,
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984). Evidence treatises and casebooks
likewise present little or no empirical studies. Those that do, cite law review articles that
include social research. See, e.g., G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE
(1978); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). For an evidence coursebook
that brings some empirical research to the study of evidence, see R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE at vii, 8, 14, 374 (2d
ed. 1986).
48. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that "[ijf scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert ...
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may testify thereto.").
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